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Suing Solely to Extract a Settlement Offer
ABSTRACT
In many disputes, the expected value to the plaintiff from
going to trial is negative, either because the chances of winning
are small or because the litigation costs are large. While such a
plaintiff would not go to trial, he might sue in the hope of
extracting a settlement offer: the defendant might make such an
offer if he is uncertain as to whether or not the expected value
to the plaintiff of going to trial is negative. This paper seeks
to identify the factors that determine: (i) whether a plaintiff
who does not intend to go to trial will nonetheless succeed in





Inmany disputes, the potential plaintiff recognizes that the
expected value to him of going to trial is negative. This might be the
case either because the chances of winning a trial are small (the suit
is ''frivolous'') or because the expected judgment is small relative to
the expected litigation costs. In such situations, however, the nega-
tive expected value of litigation might not deter the plaintiff from
suing: the plaintiff might sue —hopingto extract a settlement offer
from the defendant, and planning to drop the case if the defendant does
not make such a settlement offer.
Suing solely to extract a settlement offer is rational, of course,
only if there is some likelihood that the plaintiff will receive such an
offer. The question, then, is why a defendant would make a settlement
offer to a plaintiff for whom the expected value of going to trial is
negative. The answer to this question is not obvious: clearly, a
plaintiff's threat of going to trial will not be credible if the defen-
dant knows that it will not be in the plaintiff's interest to carry out
the threat.'
1. Thus, in examining this question, one should avoid assuming that
defendants are influenced by threats that are not credible. Such an
assumption was used by P'ng (1983), who was first in seeking to model
how plaintiffs with negative—expected—value suits can extract a
settlement offer. In his paper, a plaintiff with such a suit might
succeed in extracting an offer even though the defendant is assumed to
know that the expected value of litigation to the plaintiff is negative.
The defendant might make such an offer because of his assumed belief
that, if he does not make an offer, the plaintiff will go to trial.
P'ng justifies this assumed belief on the grounds that it is never going
to be contradicted by the facts; since the defendant's belief will
lead to his making a settlement offer, the plaintiff's willingness to
litigate in the absence of such an offer will never be tested. But even
—1—This paper analyzes a main reason as to why plaintiffs with a
negative—expected—value suit might nonetheless succeed in extracting a
settlement offer.The explanation on which this paper focuses is one
based on the presence of informational asymmetry. The plaintiff might
have some private information concerning the expected value to him of
going to trial. For example, the plaintiff might have private informa-
tion concerning the level of damages that he suffered as a result of the
defendant's actions, or concerning his expected litigation costs
(including out—of—pocket expenses, the costs of the plaintiff's own
time, the costs of the delay involved, and psychic costs). Conse-
quently, a defendant might not know what the expected value of litiga-
tion to the plaintiff is, and thus also whether or not the plaintiff
will go to trial if no settlement is reached.2
though the defendant's assumed belief is not going to be contradicted by
the facts, it is nonetheless an implausible belief. For, given P'ng's
assumptions, the defendant knows that it will not be in the plaintiff's
interest to go to trial, and there is thus no reason for the defendant
to expect the plaintiff to do so in the absence of an offer. (In
economic terminology, while P'ng was correct in proposing that the
defendant's offering to settle belongs to the set of Nash equilibria, he
should have ruled Out this outcome as one that does not belong to the
set of perfect equilibria.)
2. 1 do not wish to suggest that informational asymmetry provides the only
explanation as to why a plaintiff with a negative—expected—value suit
might succeed in extracting a settlement offer. In particular, it is
worth noting a different explanation that was recently offered by
Rosenberg and Shavell (1985). In their model, the defendant does know
that the expected value of litigation to the plaintiff is negative and
that consequently the plaintiff would not go to trial. What drives
their results is their assumption about the sequential nature in which
litigation costs are incurred. They assumed that, once a suit is filed
(at no cost to the plaintiff), the defendant must incur some significant
costs to defend himself, otherwise the plaintiff will win by default
judgment and without incurring any litigation costs. The defendant
knows that if he incurs the necessary defense costs the plaintiff will
drop the case. Yet, it is clearly rational for the defendant to pay
anything below these defense costs in order to settle the case without
having to incur these costs. Thus, in Rosenberg and Shavel].'s model,
suits are brought for their ''nuisance'' value —theplaintiff's suit
—2—In the last few years, much attention has been devoted to develop-
ing formal models of settlement and litigation decisions under imperfect
information (see, e.g., Bebchuk (1984), P'ng (1983), Reinganum and Wilde
(1985),Salant(1984), and Samuelson (1983)). None of these models,
however, has considered the important case in which the defendant is
uncertain as to whether or not the expected value of litigation to the
plaintiff is positive; to the extent that the defendant was assumed to
face uncertainty, this assumed uncertainty was only about the size of a
trial's value to the plaintiff but not about its sign. Thus, the
literature has not analyzed how settlement decisions are affected by
defendants' uncertainty as to whether the plaintiff will go to trial if
a settlement is not offered.
This paper therefore develops a model of how, in the presence of
such uncertainty, a defendant will decide whether to make a settlement
offer, and, if so, how much to offer. On the one hand, the defendant
will reason, the plaintiff might have a negative—expected—value (NEV)
suit, in which case offering to settle would be wasteful since the
plaintiff would not go to trial anyway. On the other hand, the plain—
puts the defendant in a position in which he would have to incur some
defense costs unless the plaintiff agrees to settle beforehand; and
this makes the defendant willing to pay the plaintiff for such an
agreement to settle.
While Rosenberg and Shavell's explanation might well be relevant in
some or many cases, it is unlikely to explain all the suits by
plaintiffs who will not go to trial if the defendant refuses to settle.
For in a great many cases the amount of defense costs that the defendant
has to incur before the plaintiff incurs any litigation costs is very
limited. In such cases, a plaintiff that has a negative—present—value
suit would be able to extract a significant settlement offer only if the
defendant faces uncertainty concerning the expected value to the
plaintiff of going to trial.
—3—tiff might have a positive—expected—value (PEV) suit, in which case
making a settlement offer would possibly prevent litigation and produce
a beneficial settlement. The analysis identifies the factors that
determine: (i) whether a plaintiff who does not intend to go to trial
will nonetheless succeed in extracting a settlement offer; and (ii)
how much will such a plaintiff succeed in extracting.
The analysis also identifies the effect that the presence of NEV
suits has on the resolution of PEV suits. The fact that defendants take
into account the possibility that the plaintiff's suit is a NEV one (and
that the plaintiff will thus drop the case in the event that no settle-
ment is reached) hurts those plaintiffs that do have a PEV suit. It is
shown that the presence of NEV suits reduces the settlement amounts
offered to plaintiffs with PEV suits and consequently increases the
proportion of PEV suits that end up in a trial.
II. TUE MODEL
A. Sequence of Events
A risk—neutral plaintiff files a suit against (or, more generally,
makes a demand to) a risk—neutral defendant. Filing the suit (or making
the demand) is assumed to be costless.
The subsequent sequence of events is as depicted in Figure 1 below.
Following the suit, the defendant decides whether to offer to settle,
and, if so, what settlement amount to offer. A decision to refrain from
making a settlement offer will be referred to as a decision to offer a
settlement amount 0.
—4—Following the defendant's decision, the plaintiff decides how to
respond. If the defendant offers some positive settlement amount, the
plaintiff will have to decide whether to accept the offered settlement
amount or go to trial. If the defendant does not offer to settle1 the
plaintiff will have to decide whether to drop the case (i.e., accept a
settlement amount 0) or go to trial.
B.The Consequences of a Trial
The parties' decisions are made against the background of a poten-
tial trial, which would involve litigation costs. The plaintiff esti-
mates that, in the event of a trial, the expected judgment will be W and
his expected litigation costs will be C .LetV =W—Cdenote the
p p
plaintiff's estimate of the expected value to him of going to trial. A
plaintiff with an estimate V will be referred to as one of type V.
The situation to be considered is one in which the plaintiff has
some private information about V.It will be assumed at this stage that
the plaintiff has private information only about W, and that the defen-
dant knows C. The Appendix extends the analysis to the case where the
plaintiff might have private information about both W and C.
The defendant, then, does not know V, the plaintiff's type, but
only the distribution from which V is drawn.3 Specifically, the defen—
3.If the plaintiff is of a high type, then it will be in his interest to
eliminate the informational asymmetry and to have the defendant realize
that the expected judgment is high. It will be assumed, however, that
the plaintiff cannot eliminate the informational asymmetry in any way
which is not prohibitively costly. A statement by the plaintiff about
his high estimate of the expected judgment will be disregarded unless
the plaintiff provides the defendant with a verification of his high
estimate. And the assumption is that the high—estimate plaintiff cannot
provide such a verification, or that he cannot provide it without
jeopardizing his chances should a trial take place.
—5—dant knows that V is distributed with a density function f(.)anda
cumulative distribution function F(.). It is assumed that f(.) is con—
tinuous and differentiable throughout, and that its value is positive in
the interval (—11,E:2), where K1,K2 > 0, and zero outside this interval.
Let us denote by a the likelihood that the plaintiff has a NEV
suit; that is, a =F(0).Also, let us denote by g(.) and G(.) the
density and cumulative distribution of V conditional on V.0. Thus, for
any X￿0 we have
(la) f(x) =(1—a)g(x)and
(ib) F(x) =a+(l—a)G(x).
Finally, C will denote the defendant's estimate of his expected
litigation costs in the event of a trial.(The plaintiff might or might
not know Cd.)
C.The Parties' Decisions
Consider first the plaintiff's decision whether to accept a settle-
ment amount S. Clearly, the plaintiff will accept S if and only if
(2) S ￿.V.
4. It is assumed for convenience that the plaintiff will settle if he is
indifferent between settling and litigating; the model's results will
be the same under the opposite assumption. It is not suggested that
informational asymmetry provides the only reason as to why a plaintiff
with a negative—expected--value suit might succeed in extracting a
settlement offer. In particular, it is worth noting a different
explanation that was recently offered by
—6—Thus, the plaintiff will accept the offer if and only if his type is
lower than S, the ''borderline'' type. In particular, a settlement
amount 0 will be accepted (i.e., a refusal to settle will lead to the
plaintiff's dropping the case) if and only if the plaintiff's suit is a
NEV one.
Turn now to the defendant's decision concerning which settlement
amount S to offer. The defendant knows that, if he offers an amount S,
it will be accepted with a probability F(S) and rejected with a
probability 1—F(S). In the latter case, a trial will take place and the
defendant's estimate of the expected judgment in such a trial is
12
(3) E(W IV> S) =E(V+CpIV> S) =1s +C)f(x)dx.











The defendant will choose S to solve
(5) maxA(S).
S
—7—Differentiating (4a) with respect to S and rearranging terms we get
(6a) A'(S) =—F(S)+(C+Cd)f(S).
or, equivalently,
(6b) A'(S) =—[a +(1—a)G(S)]+
(Cp+Cd)(1_a)8(S).
The first term on the right—hand—side of (6a) or (6b) represents
the marginal cost of increasing S: there is a likelihood of F(S) =u+
(1—a)G(S)that the plaintiff would accept the increased offer ,would
have accepted it even without the increase.
The second term on the right—hand—side of (6a) or (6b) represents
the marginal benefit of increasing S.Such an increase in S would
reduce the likelihood of litigation by f(S) =(1—a)g(S).And observe
that litigating against a plaintiff of the borderline type instead of
settling with him involves a loss of (C +Cd)to the defendant for
if the plaintiff is of the borderline type, the settlement amount will
give the defendant all of the settlement gains (C +Cd).
D.When will a NEV Suit Succeed?
Since a plaintiff with a NEV suit will in no case go to trial, a
NEV suit will be successful if and only if S* > 0 —thatis, if and
only if the defendant elects to offer a positive settlement amount.
Proposition 1:(a) A necessary and sufficient condition for the
defendant to offer a positive settlement amount is that there exists
some S > 0 for which
(7) [a +(1—a)6(S)].S< (l—a)G(S)[Cd +f(x
+C)dx].
—8—(b) A sufficient condition for the defendant to offer a





Proof: (a) S* is positive if and only if there exists some S > 0 for
which A(S) > A(0). Using (4a) and rearranging terms gives (7).
(b) (8) implies that the value of A'(S) (see (4b)) is positive at
S =0.it follows that (8) implies that S > 0. Q.E.D.
Corollary 1: An increase in either C or C will make it more likely
p d
that the defendant will offer a positive settlement amount to the
plaintiff.
Remark: An increase in either C or Cd increases (for any S0) the
marginal benefit of increasing S (see (6a) and (6b)). This is because
the gain from settling with a plaintiff of the borderline type instead
of litigating with him is equal to (C +Cd).
Proof: An increase in either C or C increases the right—hand—side of
p d
(7) and does not affect the left—hand—side of (7). Therefore, such an
increase makes it more likely that 17) will hold. Q.E.D.
Corollary 2: An increase in the likelihood that the plaintiff's suit is
a NEV one (i.e., an increase in a) will make it less likely that the
defendant will offer a positive settlement amount.
—9—Remark: For any S, increasing a both raises the marginal cost of
increasing S decreasesthe marginal benefit of increasing S (see
(6a) and (6b)). First, increasing a raises the marginal cost of
increasing S because it increases the likelihood that the plaintiff
would accept the settlement offer even without the marginal increase in
S.Second, increasing a lowers the marginal benefit of raising S
because it increases the extent to which this marginal increase in S
would lower the likelihood of litigation.
Proof: An increase in a will increase the left—hand—side of (7) and
will decrease the right—hand side of (7). Therefore, such an increase
will make it less likely that (7) will hold. Q.E.D.
E.How Much will a Successful NEV Suit Yield?
When (7) holds, a plaintiff who does not intend to go to trial.
will nonetheless succeed in extracting a positive settlement amount from
the defendant. Let us now examine the factors that shape the size of
that settlement amount.
Proposition 2: If the defendant elects to offer a positive settlement




(10) (S•(C+cd) < 1.
Remark: Equation (9) is the first—order condition; it implies that at
—10—the defendant's optimal settlement offer the marginal cost and benefit
of increasing the offer are equal. Equation (10) is the second—order
condition.
Proof: In the situation under consideration, the optimal settlement
offer S* is interior to the interval (OK2), because we assume that (7)
holds and hence S* > 0, and because A'(S) (see (6a)) is negative at K2.
Consequently, at S* the first—order and second—order conditions must
hold. Requiring that A'(S) be equal to zero at S gives (9). Differ-
entiating A'(S) with respect to S, rearranging terms, and requiring
negativity at S gives (10). Q.E.D.
Corollary 1: An increase in either C or C will raise the amount that
p d
a successful NEV suit will yield.
Remark: As already explained, an increase in either C or Cd will raise
the marginal benefit of increasing S.
Proof: Differentiating (9) with respect to (C +
Cd)and rearranging
terms gives




Andthesecond—order condition (10) implies that the right—hand side of
(11) is positive. Q.E.D.
Corollary 2: An increase in the likelihood that the plaintiff's suit is
a NEY one (an increase in a) will reduce the amount that a successful
NEY suit will yield.
—11—Remark: As already explained, increasing a will both raise the marginal
cost of increasing S and lower the marginal benefit of increasing S.






And the second—order condition (10) implies that the right—hand side of
(12) is negative. Q.E.D.
F.The Effect of NEV Suits on
the Resolution of PEV Suits
Let us now turn to the effect that the presence of NEV suits has on
the resolution of PEV suits.
Proposition 3: In comparison to the situation that would obtain if
there were no NEV suits, the presence of NEV suits (a) lowers the
settlement amounts for which PEV are settled; and (b) increases the
proportion of PEV suits that are not settled but rather lead to trial.
Remark: The intuition behind the two parts of the Proposition is as
follows.(a) As is clear from the remark explaining Corollary 2 of
Proposition 2, the possibility that the suit is a NEV one leads defen-
dants to offer lower settlement amounts than they would otherwise offer.
(b) Because the presence of NEV suits lowers the settlement
amounts offered by defendants, it increases the likelihood that a
plaintiff with a PEV suit will reject the offer made to him and go to
trial.
—12—Proof:(a) Proposition 1(b) and Corollary 2 of Proposition 2 indicate
that S* is lower than what it would be if a were equal to 0 —thatis,
if there were no likelihood that the plaintiff's suit is a NEV one.
(b) The likelihood that a PEVsuitwill lead to trial is 1—
G(S*), which obviously increases as S is lowered.
III. CONCLUDING REMARKS
1.The analysisof this paper suggests a main way in which legal
rules and institutions affect the incidence and success of suits solely
aimed at extracting a settlement offer. As was shown, the possibility
of bringing a successful NEV suit is facilitated by the presence of
informational asymmetry concerning the value to the plaintiff of going
to trial. Various legal rules and institutions affect, of course, the
extent to which such an informational asymmetry might be present. For
example, discovery rules often enable the defendant to learn some of the
plaintiff's private information concerning the expected outcome of a
trial. Rules and institutions which reduce such informational asym—
metrics are likely to make it more difficult for NEV suits to be
successful (and thus also to increase the proportion of PEV suits that
will be settled).
2. An important issue of interest that the model leaves unexamined
is that of information transmission. The model's assumption that the
defendant is the only party that makes settlement offers is used to rule
out the possibility of defendants' learning from plaintiffs' demands:
—13—if the plaintiff were to make a settlement demand, the defendant might
infer from it some information concerning the plaintiff's type, and the
informational asymmetry might be consequently reduced. This possibility
of information transmission through plaintiffs' demands is an issue that
should be treated in a complete model of suits by plaintiffs who will
not go to trial if the defendant does not settle.
—14—APPENDIX
This Appendix extends the analysis to the case where the plaintiff
might have private information not only about W but also about C.
Consider, under the new assumption, the defendant's choice of S.
The defendant knows that an offer S will be accepted with a probability
F(S) and rejected with a probability 1 —F(S).In the latter case, a
trial will take place and the defendant's estimate of the expected







Thus, the defendant's expected position if he offers a settlement









The defendant will of course choose S to maximize the value of
A(S). Differentiating the right—hand side of (Al) with respect to S
gives
—15—(A4) A'(S) =—F(S)+f(S)[C+E(C/V=S)], d p
or,equivalently,
(AS) A'(S) =—[a+(l—a)G(S)]+(l_a)g(S)(Ci.E(CIV=S)].
The interpretation of (A4) and (AS) is similar to that of (6a) and
(6b). Thefirstterm on the right—hand side of (A4) or (AS) represents
the marginal cost of increasing S: there is a likelihood of F(S) =a+
(l—a)G(S)that the plaintiff would accept the increased offer and would
have accepted the offer even without the marginal increase. The second
term on the right—hand side of (A4) or (A5) represents the marginal
benefit of increasing S. Such an increase in S would reduce the like-
lihood of litigation by f(S) =(1—a)g(S),and litigating against a
plaintiff of the borderline type instead of settling with him would
involve a loss of (Cd +E(C/V=S)].
Proceeding in a similar way to that followed in Section II, the
following propositions and corollaries can be proved.
Proposition Al: (a) A necessary and sufficient condition for the
defendant to offer a positive settlement amount is that there exists
some S > 0 for which
(A6) (a+(l—a)G(S)].S < (l—a)G(S)(Cd +f(E(C
IVx)+x] dx).
(b) A sufficient condition for the defendant to offer a
positive settlement amount is that
—16—[C +E(CIV0)]g(O)
(7) a<1+[C+E(C,VO)1
Corollary 1: An increase in Cd will make it more likely that the defen-
dant will offer a positive settlement amount, Similarly, an upward shift
in the distribution of C (holding fixed the distribution of V) will
make it more likely that the defendant will offer a positive settlement
amount.
Corollary 2: An increase in the likelihood that the plaintiff's suit is
a NEV one (an increase in a) will make it less likely that the defendant
will offer a positive settlement amount.
Proposition A2: If the defendant elects to offer a positive settlement
amount, that settlement amount will be characterized by




Corollary 1: An increase in Cd will raise the settlement amount that a
successful NEY suit will yield. Similarly, an upwards shift in the
distribution of C (holding fixed the distribution of V) will increase
the settlement amount that a successful NEV suit will yield.
—17—Corollary 2: An increase in the likelihood that the plaintiff's suit is
a NEV one (an increase in a) will reduce the amount that a successful
NEV suit will yield.
Proposition 3: In comparison to the situation that would obtain if
there were no NEV suits, the presence of NEV suits (a) lowers the
settlement amounts for which PEV are settled; and (b) increases the
proportion of PEV suits that are not settled but rather lead to trial.
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